The Social Cost of Activism

TL;DR: There is inherent harm done when we criticize our useful institutions. To reduce this inherent harm done by criticism, we should always be honest and nuanced in our calls for reform.

You may decide whether or not to advocate for a reform by simply weighting the reform’s cost and benefits. If the reform produces a better outcome than the status quo, that is reason enough to advocate for that reform. But there are inherent costs when we push for reform, since pushing for reform requires criticizing the institutions’ status quo. And these costs are especially large when that criticism is unfair and unmeasured. As I discussed in the previous article, the internal conflict between our desire to correct injustice and our desire to preserve the status quo manifests through the Just-World Fallacy. And our inherent bias towards tradition and upholding the status quo serves a real social function.

When certain institutions commit an injustice, advocates may publicly decry the injustice and push whatever necessary reform on that institution to prevent the injustice from being repeated. Yet regardless of how useful that reform actually is, there is a social harm that arises from criticism. If an institution is useful on the whole, meaning that society is better off with than without the institution, calling for reform can stigmatize the overall work of that institution, even unintentionally.

Take the case of the police. Most people (and empirical research) would agree that a society with police is better than without one. And people may even agree that a change in policy (such as banning certain practices or dismantling police unions) may even be beneficial. But what they might ignore is the harm done by attacking the institution itself. Through directing exaggerated and unfair criticism at the police, we risk undermining the organization which we seek to improve. As a result of criticism, the police may become less motivated and receive less talent than it otherwise would due to astigmatism. Civilians may become hesitant to call the police during a real emergency, based on advocates misleading rhetoric on police violence. And the police may receive less funding, which would lead to greater injustices committed by criminals.

Liberals may not have liked that example, but take another — the IRS. In 2013, the IRS came under fire, especially from the right, for imposing intensive scrutiny on political groups which had applied for tax-exempt status. You may recognize that preventing a tax authority from targeting selected political groups is socially good. And you may recognize that the IRS itself is socially useful. And, based on the actual outcomes of the controversy, you may also recognize that right-wing rhetoric against the agency as a whole did more harm than good.

Through exaggerated criticisms, the IRS’s legitimacy fell in the eyes of the taxpayer, who may have become more willing to underreport their income. The IRS likely received fewer qualified candidates to fill its positions, under the misleading belief that the agency is corrupt. And importantly, it had seen its funding slashed as a result of the controversy, leading to a decline in audits and more tax evasion. Criticizing the IRS for its injustice led to a weaker IRS, which may have been the of its critics goal.

For more recent examples, take right-wing criticisms against the NIH and CDC. The institutions may have committed injustices, such as carelessly providing funding for gain-of-function research or providing knowingly false information to the public regarding public health measures; but that can still mean undermining their legitimacy can be harmful.

We have a sense of this cost intuitively. If we have a friend (and say we are a good friend), we recognize that any measured criticism against a friend for an immoral action should be told to that friend in private, not in the company of others. We may want that friend not to do an injustice, but we also don’t want to harm that friend’s legitimacy in the eyes of others. Our criticism may be perfectly valid, but we know that a public criticism would lead others to look down on the criticized friend. And this is what is imposed by advocates onto flawed but otherwise beneficial institutions.

This social cost of activism may be accounted for by conservatives but disregarded by liberals. Those who are overly excited in their desire to change the world may overlook the costs which criticizing the status quo imposes.

This doesn’t mean we should refrain from criticizing our institutions when a wrong is committed. We may be willing to accept the social costs that come with rightful criticisms against institutions. But that cost is real. It is not “conservative” in itself to say that the cost exists. It is only prudent and accurate.

To minimize this cost, we should be careful when criticizing. We should be measured and fact-based, understanding the institution’s value as a whole and be clear with the intentions of our rightful complaints. Even if exaggeration would be more likely to lead to a favored reform from taking place, we must strive to be honest and careful of doing unintended harm.

This social cost is of course not limited to government agencies; the same principle would apply to other criticized organizations such as academia, media, and private businesses. There are injustices committed within these groups; but these organizations also produce value that becomes endangered as a result of criticism.

There are things we can and must do to reduce this social cost. We can withhold judgement until all the facts are present. We can try to be nuanced. We can present measured criticisms while always remembering the overall value of the institution. What we cannot do is argue in bad faith, exaggerate claims for applause lines, and be careless with the facts.

This is also not a call for government regulation of criticism, which is antithetical to a free society. Not to mention a serious conflict of interest. How can the government possessing a monopoly in the regulation of criticism be fair when regulating criticism against itself? Rather, this calls for moral regulation.

We should seek to be fair and nuanced with our criticisms and even be willing to criticize the unfair critics, even though we may be on their side. The reformers may be in the right and may even be worth joining. But they undoubtedly impose a cost on the system that needs to be considered. Before we take a side, we would be wise to understand the social costs of activism.